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India is in the market for a new fighter plane—actually, about 200 new fighter planes. The
country's fleet of MiG 21s is aging and increasingly prone to accidents, so it is seeking a
replacement capable of air superiority and ground-attack missions [1]. Initial reports suggested
that the indigenously produced Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA) might play this role. The Tejas,
however, has been plagued with problems; a government investigation identified 53 design flaws,
including underpowered engines, excess weight, poor maneuverability, lack of fuel capacity,
underperforming radar, and maintenance shortcomings. Thus, despite a development process
spanning more than 30 years, the Tejas remains unfit for combat duty. A Tejas Mark II will
supposedly address many of the first edition’s shortcomings, but flight testing is not expected to
commence until late 2018. 
Indian leaders are therefore looking to foreign manufacturers to produce a single-engine fighter
in India, in accordance with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s [2] so-called Make in India [3] initiative.
It appears that New Delhi will choose between Lockheed Martin’s F-16 Fighting Falcon and
Saab’s JAS 39 Gripen. The F-16 and the Gripen are highly capable and technically well
matched, and both have their advocates in the Indian strategic community. The Falcon is
particularly attractive, however, because of its ubiquity; it is one of the most widely used fighter
aircraft in the world. By taking over production, India would be tapping into a large market for the
plane and related products and services.
Lockheed Martin is offering to move its entire production line for the iconic fighter plane from
Texas to India [4]. That would be a second-best option for all involved. From a U.S. perspective,
the optimal outcome would be to acquire India as an F-16 customer while continuing to produce
the plane in Texas and keeping the associated jobs at home. From an Indian perspective, the
best outcome would be the development of an indigenous fighter aircraft to avoid reliance on
anyone else’s technology. Such independence has always been an important Indian strategic
goal.
3/16/17, 2:35 PMF-16s, Made in India
Page 2 of 3https://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/1119631
But neither side has any real alternative. For all of India’s recent economic and technical
achievements [5], it lacks the ability to develop a world-class fighter on its own, as the LCA project
painfully and repeatedly demonstrated. Insisting on an indigenous solution would result in
endless delays and a sub-standard product, seriously compromising Indian security. Further, the
Tejas is already built largely from imported parts, including U.S. engines. Thus, by buying a
foreign aircraft, India is actually forgoing less autonomy than it initially might appear.
The United States, for its part, needs partnership with India to ensure that F-16 production
[6]continues. The United States acquired its first operational F-16s in 1979 and received its last
plane in 2005. With no new F-16 orders scheduled beyond this year, the Texas assembly line
could soon shut down. A deal with India would not keep the U.S. plant open, but it would at least
ensure that the aircraft remains in production, generating employment and revenue from such
sources as parts orders and licensing fees. These benefits would grow as India sells planes to
new or returning third-party customers, which could include Bahrain, Colombia, and Indonesia,
among others.
Perhaps most important, the Lockheed deal would give India and the United States [7] an
opportunity to work together on a significant, technically sophisticated defense project. That
would build trust and bind the two countries closer as China’s rise creates uncertainty in the
Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. Indo-Swedish cooperation on the Gripen would
undoubtedly be a good thing as well. It is not, however, as strategically valuable to India or the
United States as a closer Indo-American partnership [8].
It is true that the F-16’s capabilities are well known to potential adversaries, particularly the
Pakistanis, who have flown the aircraft since the 1980s. But this is a tradeoff inherent in getting
one of the world’s most proven combat aircraft. More important, the Block-70 version of the F-16
that India would produce features upgrades in avionics and operational capabilities that far
outstrip the older Pakistani planes. And India would likely be able to veto future F-16 sales to
sensitive states such as Pakistan. Pakistani familiarity with the F-16, then, is not a reason to
avoid it.
An agreement to produce F-16s in India might not be what either the United States or India
would want in a perfect world. But in the real world, insistence on the ideal will lead to something
worse than the compromises inherent in an F-16 agreement. In far too many cases, India’s quest
for the ideal in defense acquisitions has resulted in sub-optimal outcomes. In India’s search for a
new fighter plane, second best is best.
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